Książka o charakterze eseju filozoficznego napisana na początku lat siedemdziesiątych wieku XX przez młodzieńca ledwie po dwudziestce. Jak sam przyznał w posłowiu, nie zyskała uznania w środowisku filozofów, zapewne dlatego, że napisana jest z pasją, co jest uszczerbkiem na profesjonalizmie. Ale dzięki temu czyta się dobrze. Dawkinsa czyta się oczywiście dużo lepiej, ale z mniejszym przekonaniem o filozoficznej wartości jego książek. Naczelna teza teistów w ujęciu Dawkinsa przy Smithcie (Smisie?) wydaje się dość naiwna, skoro użyte w niej pojęcie „nadnaturalności” samo w sobie jest bardzo problematyczne. Jeśli wierzący chce uzasadniać wiarą swoje przekonanie o istnieniu Boga, to pytam, czemu ma mnie przekonać wiara papieża Franciszka - w odróżnieniu od wiary Chameneiego. A jeśli nie wiara, to argumenty racjonalne, a wtedy pierwszy problem wierzącego to podanie sensownej definicji Boga (w szczególności niesprzecznej wewnętrznie). Od Katechizmu KK, przez wyznawców Allaha, hinduistów, dżinistów, judaistów, mormonów itd. - nikt takiej jak dotąd nie sformułował. To niby kończy dyskusję w zarodku, ale ateiści, w tej liczbie Smith, nie milczą. Całe szczęście, bo inaczej apologeci wiary mogliby fałszywie twierdzić, że nie ma krytyki, więc racja jest po ich stronie.
[30]
The label “atheist” announces one's disagreement with theism. It does not announce one's agreement with, or approval of, other atheists.
[43]
A god is a supernatural being - which implies, metaphysically, that a god is not subject to the natural laws of the universe; and, epistemologically, that a god transcends human understanding. These are the basic beliefs of theism: the belief in the supernatural and the belief in the inherently unknowable.
Zauważmy, że w tym sensie szatan jest bogiem.
[65]
The theologian may object here, pointing out that many words - such as “justice” and “consciousness” - do not signify material objects. The referents of these and many other words are immaterial, so why should the atheist complain when God is also said to be immaterial?
While it is true that “justice” and “consciousness” do not designate material beings, the theist must remember that they do not refer to immaterial beings either. “Justice” is a moral abstraction derived from various aspects of man's nature and social interactions. “Consciousness” refers to the state of awareness exhibited by particular living organisms.
[72]
The Old Testament God garnered an impressive list of atrocities. He demanded and sanctioned human sacrifices (Leviticus 27:28-29; Judges 11:29-40; 2 Samuel 21:1-9). He killed the first-born of every Egyptian family (Exodus 12:29). He sanctioned slavery (Exodus 21:2-6; Leviticus 25:44-46) and the selling of one's daughter (Exodus 21:7). He commanded the killing of witches (Exodus 22.18), death for heresy (Exodus 22:20), death for violating the sabbath (Exodus 31:14-15), death for cursing one's parents (Leviticus 20:9), death for adultery (Leviticus 20:10), death for blasphemy (Leviticus 24.16), and death by stoning for unchastity at the time of marriage - a penalty imposed only upon women (Deuteronomy 22:20-21).
[73]
The Christian God, they assure us, is a being of mercy and love. But this assertion is difficult to defend While the old god was cruel, he at least restricted his infliction of misery to this life. The Christian God, however, reportedly extends this misery to eternity. According to the New Testament, Jesus repeatedly threatened disbelievers with eternal torment, and we must wonder how the doctrine of hell can be reconciled with the notion of an all-merciful God.
[74]
The liberal theologian Leslie D. Weatherhead defends this approach as follows:
[79]
Even if we overlook the preceding difficulties, the appeal to free will is still unsuccessful, because it encompasses only so-called moral evils (i.e., the actions of men). There remains the considerable problem of physical evils, such as natural disasters, over which man has no control. Why are there floods, earthquakes and diseases that kill and maim millions of persons? The responsibility for these occurrences obviously cannot be placed on the shoulders of man. From an atheistic standpoint, such phenomena are inimical to man's life and may be termed evil, but since they are the result of inanimate, natural forces and do not involve conscious intent, they do not fall within the province of moral judgment. But from a Christian perspective, God - the omnipotent creator of the natural universe - must bear ultimate responsibility for these occurrences, and God's deliberate choice of these evil phenomena qualifies him as immoral.
[100]
If there is no conflict between reason and faith, why has Christianity insisted on rigorous censorship of dissent? If the Catholic Church is an institution committed to rationality and truth, why has it subjected dissenters to torture and death? The man of reason, the man concerned with arriving at truth, supports his ideas with reasons and evidence - not with a torture rack and stake.
[106]
Autor wykonuje myślowy eksperyment: przyjmijmy za prawdę każde twierdzenie potwierdzone orłem po rzucie monetą. Czy jest to racjonalne? Podobnie jest z wiarą jako rzekomym źródłem wiedzy o świecie.
As with coin flipping, even if there were cases where propositions of faith coincide with actual fact, this would not prove the rationality of faith.
[142]
Anything asked in the name of Jesus will be granted, including the miraculous transportation of a mountain. It would take very few examples of mountain moving to convert the atheists of the world, but the modern Christian is reluctant to defend these grandiose claims of faith, much less attempt an actual demonstration.
[147]
Jeśli wierzymy w fakty ustalane przez naukę, to uznajemy autorytet uczonych. Dlaczego więc na tej zasadzie nie odwołać się do autorytetu np. papieża?
First, the authority must be willing to present evidence in support of his beliefs. Second, the proposition of the authority must be verifiable in principle by any person who cares to take the time and effort required. Third, the propositions of the authority can never contradict the laws of logic. A contradiction can never be true, regardless of the academic qualifications of the person advocating it.
[154, o zakładzie Pascala]
What have we got to lose? Intellectual integrity, self-esteem, and a passionate, rewarding life for starters. In short, everything that makes life worth living. Far from being a safe bet, Pascal's wager requires the wager of one's life and happiness.
[174, o religijnym „wyjaśnieniu” cudów]
Another definition of a miracle is any event so unusual that it can be explained only with reference to a supernatural power. Thus if we were to observe an exceptionally strange occurrence, such as an iron bar floating on water, we might conclude that a supernatural being is at work.
This kind of argument mistakenly assumes that positing a god somehow explains an unexplained event. The theist observes the “floating iron,” thinks, “How amazing! How is it possible?” - and then provides himself with the solution: “An unknowable power must be responsible.” But this explains nothing. One cannot answer the question, “How is it possible?” with the response, “An unknowable being using unknowable means did it.”
[175]
The controversy between naturalism and supernaturalism is not a contest between two rival modes of explanation; it is not a matter of which provides a better explanation. Rather, it is an issue of explanation versus no explanation whatsoever.
[188, o „wyjaśnieniu” wszechświata]
The natural, knowable universe provides the context in which all explanations are possible, so to demand an explanation for the universe itself is epistemologically absurd.
[196]
“What caused the universe?” is an absurd question, because before something can act as a cause, it must first exist - i.e., it must first be part of the universe.
[212]
It is interesting to observe that if an event appears to contravene the order of nature, the theist is the first to proclaim that a natural law has been violated and that this miraculous event is evidence of a supernatural influence. Yet this same theist will appeal to the presence of order and natural law as evidence for god as well. If nature is not uniform, this proves the existence of god. If nature is uniform, this also proves the existence of god. Whichever way we turn, god gets the credit, which, of course, is remarkably convenient for the theist.
[232]
Those philosophers who object to an ethics of happiness or well-being on the grounds that it permits every person to do as he pleases without regard for the life and property of others, display a shocking disregard for even the rudimentary facts of human psychology.
[234]
Autor pisze o meta-etyce, czyli źródle naszych moralnych przekonań. Dla chrześcijanina moralne jest to, co zaleca Biblia.
This kind of conflict occurs when an atheist argues moral issues with a Christian. If the Christian contends that blasphemy is immoral because the Bible forbids it, the atheist will not deny that the Bible forbids blasphemy. Instead, the atheist will refuse to accept the Bible as a criterion of morality, and he will refuse to accept a concept of “immoral” that means that which is prohibited by the Bible.
W teorii różne założenia meta-etyczne mogą prowadzić do podobnych konkluzji, lecz różnice są nieuniknione. Smith rozróżnia moralne standardy od systemu „nakazowo-rozdzielczego”, który charakteryzuje religię. Posługując się standardem, który nakazuje faworyzować wybory zmniejszające cierpienie i sprzyjające szczęściu, nie zdołamy potępić victimless crimes (czyli zbrodnie bez ofiar), jakimi dla ludzi religijnych są masturbacja czy bluźnierstwo - absurdalne ze świeckiego punktu widzenia. Wierzący lubią mówić o obiektywnej moralności, którą ponoć zapewnia nam Bóg przez natchnione teksty. Przykład fundamentalny to dziesięcioro przykazań. Mało kto zadaje sobie trud przeczytania ich w biblijnym oryginale, a wielce by się zdziwił. Czy naprawdę należy zabijać sąsiada, który pracuje w dzień święty? Czy należy kamienować dzieci złorzeczące rodzicom? Czy rodzicom zawsze należy się cześć? Matce alkoholiczce, która porzuciła dziecko też? Jeśli pożądam żonę bliźniego lub inną jego rzecz, to jestem moralną szmatą, nawet jeśli w żaden sposób nie przekuwam pożądania w czyn? Poza tym, ile to z tych przykazań znajduje miejsce w nowoczesnych kodeksach karnych? Mnie wyszło, że trzy, a jeśli dodać idiotyczną ochronę uczuć religijnych w Polsce - cztery. Pomijam przykazania, które powinny się znaleźć w dekalogu, jak potępienie niewolnictwa, gdybyśmy chcieli mówić o jakiejś sensownej propozycji. Gdzie indziej w Biblii Bóg zaleca, aby składać mu w ofierze jagnię, ale jakby co, to gołąb też może być. I tak wyglądają, proszę państwa, „obiektywne” wartości moralne.
[250, przekonujące przypuszczenie, czemu ewangelie powstały wiele lat po śmierci Jezusa]
It is clear that the early Christians were expecting his imminent return, and they saw no reason to compile written accounts of his life for future generations.
[254]
It is interesting to note that in many cases Jesus did not lay claim to the originality now credited to him. The famous Golden Rule is a case in point. Advocated by Confucius 500 years before Jesus, it was also promulgated by Hillel, a Pharisee and older contemporary of Jesus. Quoting the Jewish Talmud:
A similar example is found in Matthew 22:39 - “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” - which Christians like also to attribute to the moral creativity of Jesus. Unfortunately for them, however, we encounter the identical words in Leviticus 19:18: “...you shall love your neighbor as yourself.”
[257]
Considered in themselves, the moral precepts of Jesus are sometimes interesting, sometimes poetic, sometimes benevolent, sometimes confusing, sometimes pernicious, and sometimes devastatingly harmful psychologically. None, however, are especially profound. If not for their tremendous historical impact, most would deserve little more than a philosopher's passing glance.
[30]
The label “atheist” announces one's disagreement with theism. It does not announce one's agreement with, or approval of, other atheists.
[43]
A god is a supernatural being - which implies, metaphysically, that a god is not subject to the natural laws of the universe; and, epistemologically, that a god transcends human understanding. These are the basic beliefs of theism: the belief in the supernatural and the belief in the inherently unknowable.
Zauważmy, że w tym sensie szatan jest bogiem.
[65]
The theologian may object here, pointing out that many words - such as “justice” and “consciousness” - do not signify material objects. The referents of these and many other words are immaterial, so why should the atheist complain when God is also said to be immaterial?
While it is true that “justice” and “consciousness” do not designate material beings, the theist must remember that they do not refer to immaterial beings either. “Justice” is a moral abstraction derived from various aspects of man's nature and social interactions. “Consciousness” refers to the state of awareness exhibited by particular living organisms.
[72]
The Old Testament God garnered an impressive list of atrocities. He demanded and sanctioned human sacrifices (Leviticus 27:28-29; Judges 11:29-40; 2 Samuel 21:1-9). He killed the first-born of every Egyptian family (Exodus 12:29). He sanctioned slavery (Exodus 21:2-6; Leviticus 25:44-46) and the selling of one's daughter (Exodus 21:7). He commanded the killing of witches (Exodus 22.18), death for heresy (Exodus 22:20), death for violating the sabbath (Exodus 31:14-15), death for cursing one's parents (Leviticus 20:9), death for adultery (Leviticus 20:10), death for blasphemy (Leviticus 24.16), and death by stoning for unchastity at the time of marriage - a penalty imposed only upon women (Deuteronomy 22:20-21).
[73]
The Christian God, they assure us, is a being of mercy and love. But this assertion is difficult to defend While the old god was cruel, he at least restricted his infliction of misery to this life. The Christian God, however, reportedly extends this misery to eternity. According to the New Testament, Jesus repeatedly threatened disbelievers with eternal torment, and we must wonder how the doctrine of hell can be reconciled with the notion of an all-merciful God.
[74]
The liberal theologian Leslie D. Weatherhead defends this approach as follows:
when Jesus is reported as consigning to everlasting torture those who displease him or do not “believe” what he says, I know in my heart that there is something wrong somewhere. Either he is misreported or misunderstood... So I put this alleged saying in my mental drawer awaiting further light, or else I reject it out of hand By the judgment of a court within my own breast... I reject such sayings.Put simply, the New Testament does not say what Weatherhead feels that it should say, so he prefers to ignore the unpleasant (and numerous) New Testament references to hell through the unique epistemological process of “knowing” in one's heart.
[79]
Even if we overlook the preceding difficulties, the appeal to free will is still unsuccessful, because it encompasses only so-called moral evils (i.e., the actions of men). There remains the considerable problem of physical evils, such as natural disasters, over which man has no control. Why are there floods, earthquakes and diseases that kill and maim millions of persons? The responsibility for these occurrences obviously cannot be placed on the shoulders of man. From an atheistic standpoint, such phenomena are inimical to man's life and may be termed evil, but since they are the result of inanimate, natural forces and do not involve conscious intent, they do not fall within the province of moral judgment. But from a Christian perspective, God - the omnipotent creator of the natural universe - must bear ultimate responsibility for these occurrences, and God's deliberate choice of these evil phenomena qualifies him as immoral.
[100]
If there is no conflict between reason and faith, why has Christianity insisted on rigorous censorship of dissent? If the Catholic Church is an institution committed to rationality and truth, why has it subjected dissenters to torture and death? The man of reason, the man concerned with arriving at truth, supports his ideas with reasons and evidence - not with a torture rack and stake.
[106]
Autor wykonuje myślowy eksperyment: przyjmijmy za prawdę każde twierdzenie potwierdzone orłem po rzucie monetą. Czy jest to racjonalne? Podobnie jest z wiarą jako rzekomym źródłem wiedzy o świecie.
As with coin flipping, even if there were cases where propositions of faith coincide with actual fact, this would not prove the rationality of faith.
[142]
Anything asked in the name of Jesus will be granted, including the miraculous transportation of a mountain. It would take very few examples of mountain moving to convert the atheists of the world, but the modern Christian is reluctant to defend these grandiose claims of faith, much less attempt an actual demonstration.
[147]
Jeśli wierzymy w fakty ustalane przez naukę, to uznajemy autorytet uczonych. Dlaczego więc na tej zasadzie nie odwołać się do autorytetu np. papieża?
First, the authority must be willing to present evidence in support of his beliefs. Second, the proposition of the authority must be verifiable in principle by any person who cares to take the time and effort required. Third, the propositions of the authority can never contradict the laws of logic. A contradiction can never be true, regardless of the academic qualifications of the person advocating it.
[154, o zakładzie Pascala]
What have we got to lose? Intellectual integrity, self-esteem, and a passionate, rewarding life for starters. In short, everything that makes life worth living. Far from being a safe bet, Pascal's wager requires the wager of one's life and happiness.
[174, o religijnym „wyjaśnieniu” cudów]
Another definition of a miracle is any event so unusual that it can be explained only with reference to a supernatural power. Thus if we were to observe an exceptionally strange occurrence, such as an iron bar floating on water, we might conclude that a supernatural being is at work.
This kind of argument mistakenly assumes that positing a god somehow explains an unexplained event. The theist observes the “floating iron,” thinks, “How amazing! How is it possible?” - and then provides himself with the solution: “An unknowable power must be responsible.” But this explains nothing. One cannot answer the question, “How is it possible?” with the response, “An unknowable being using unknowable means did it.”
[175]
The controversy between naturalism and supernaturalism is not a contest between two rival modes of explanation; it is not a matter of which provides a better explanation. Rather, it is an issue of explanation versus no explanation whatsoever.
[188, o „wyjaśnieniu” wszechświata]
The natural, knowable universe provides the context in which all explanations are possible, so to demand an explanation for the universe itself is epistemologically absurd.
[196]
“What caused the universe?” is an absurd question, because before something can act as a cause, it must first exist - i.e., it must first be part of the universe.
[212]
It is interesting to observe that if an event appears to contravene the order of nature, the theist is the first to proclaim that a natural law has been violated and that this miraculous event is evidence of a supernatural influence. Yet this same theist will appeal to the presence of order and natural law as evidence for god as well. If nature is not uniform, this proves the existence of god. If nature is uniform, this also proves the existence of god. Whichever way we turn, god gets the credit, which, of course, is remarkably convenient for the theist.
[232]
Those philosophers who object to an ethics of happiness or well-being on the grounds that it permits every person to do as he pleases without regard for the life and property of others, display a shocking disregard for even the rudimentary facts of human psychology.
[234]
Autor pisze o meta-etyce, czyli źródle naszych moralnych przekonań. Dla chrześcijanina moralne jest to, co zaleca Biblia.
This kind of conflict occurs when an atheist argues moral issues with a Christian. If the Christian contends that blasphemy is immoral because the Bible forbids it, the atheist will not deny that the Bible forbids blasphemy. Instead, the atheist will refuse to accept the Bible as a criterion of morality, and he will refuse to accept a concept of “immoral” that means that which is prohibited by the Bible.
W teorii różne założenia meta-etyczne mogą prowadzić do podobnych konkluzji, lecz różnice są nieuniknione. Smith rozróżnia moralne standardy od systemu „nakazowo-rozdzielczego”, który charakteryzuje religię. Posługując się standardem, który nakazuje faworyzować wybory zmniejszające cierpienie i sprzyjające szczęściu, nie zdołamy potępić victimless crimes (czyli zbrodnie bez ofiar), jakimi dla ludzi religijnych są masturbacja czy bluźnierstwo - absurdalne ze świeckiego punktu widzenia. Wierzący lubią mówić o obiektywnej moralności, którą ponoć zapewnia nam Bóg przez natchnione teksty. Przykład fundamentalny to dziesięcioro przykazań. Mało kto zadaje sobie trud przeczytania ich w biblijnym oryginale, a wielce by się zdziwił. Czy naprawdę należy zabijać sąsiada, który pracuje w dzień święty? Czy należy kamienować dzieci złorzeczące rodzicom? Czy rodzicom zawsze należy się cześć? Matce alkoholiczce, która porzuciła dziecko też? Jeśli pożądam żonę bliźniego lub inną jego rzecz, to jestem moralną szmatą, nawet jeśli w żaden sposób nie przekuwam pożądania w czyn? Poza tym, ile to z tych przykazań znajduje miejsce w nowoczesnych kodeksach karnych? Mnie wyszło, że trzy, a jeśli dodać idiotyczną ochronę uczuć religijnych w Polsce - cztery. Pomijam przykazania, które powinny się znaleźć w dekalogu, jak potępienie niewolnictwa, gdybyśmy chcieli mówić o jakiejś sensownej propozycji. Gdzie indziej w Biblii Bóg zaleca, aby składać mu w ofierze jagnię, ale jakby co, to gołąb też może być. I tak wyglądają, proszę państwa, „obiektywne” wartości moralne.
[250, przekonujące przypuszczenie, czemu ewangelie powstały wiele lat po śmierci Jezusa]
It is clear that the early Christians were expecting his imminent return, and they saw no reason to compile written accounts of his life for future generations.
[254]
It is interesting to note that in many cases Jesus did not lay claim to the originality now credited to him. The famous Golden Rule is a case in point. Advocated by Confucius 500 years before Jesus, it was also promulgated by Hillel, a Pharisee and older contemporary of Jesus. Quoting the Jewish Talmud:
And Hillel said: What thou dost not like, do thou not to thy neighbor. That is the whole law; all the rest is explanation. (Sabbath 31:1)[255]
A similar example is found in Matthew 22:39 - “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” - which Christians like also to attribute to the moral creativity of Jesus. Unfortunately for them, however, we encounter the identical words in Leviticus 19:18: “...you shall love your neighbor as yourself.”
[257]
Considered in themselves, the moral precepts of Jesus are sometimes interesting, sometimes poetic, sometimes benevolent, sometimes confusing, sometimes pernicious, and sometimes devastatingly harmful psychologically. None, however, are especially profound. If not for their tremendous historical impact, most would deserve little more than a philosopher's passing glance.
Brak komentarzy:
Prześlij komentarz